LAS PARTES DEL ALMA Y LA RELACIÓN ENTRE RAZÓN Y EMOCIONALIDAD EN LA VIRTUD ARISTOTÉLICA

Translated title of the contribution: Parts of the Soul and the Relation between Reason and Emotionality in Aristotelian Virtue

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Abstract

I take as a starting point the distinction made by Aristotle in NE I 13 between two functions of the soul that take part in reason, and I argue that both are proper of the human soul (i.e. not shared as such with other non-rational animals). My further aim is to emphasize the integration of emotions and reason in Aristotle’s practical rationality, against dualistic readings of the Aristotelian ethical virtue, that segregate the functions of reason and sensibility. Thus, I defend that reason has a direct influence on emotions, although this influence is not to be understood, as some authors suggest, as a rhetorical persuasion. Instead, the goal of early ethical education would be to make the non-rational part receptive to the mandates of reason.

Translated title of the contributionParts of the Soul and the Relation between Reason and Emotionality in Aristotelian Virtue
Original languageSpanish
Pages (from-to)119-142
Number of pages24
JournalActa Philosophica
Volume31
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 2022
Externally publishedYes

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