On Metaphysics’ Independence from Truthmaking. Or, Why Humean Supervenience is Compatible with the Growing Block Universe

ALDO FILOMENO FARRERONS

Resultado de la investigación: Contribución a una revistaArtículorevisión exhaustiva

Resumen

This paper aims to support the claim that analytic metaphysics should be more cautious regarding the constraints that truthmaking considerations impose on metaphysical theories. To this end, I reply to Briggs and Forbes (Philos Stud 174(4):927–943, 2017), who argue that certain truthmaking commitments are incurred by a Humean metaphysics and by the Growing-Block theory. First, I argue that Humean Supervenience does not need to endorse a standard version of truthmaker maximalism. This undermines Briggs and Forbes’s conclusion that Humean Supervenience and the Growing-Block theory are incompatible. Second, I argue that the Growing-Block theory does not commit us to any weaker version of truthmaker maximalism, which also undermines Briggs and Forbes’s conclusion. Finally, I point out other reasons to think that any version of truthmaker maximalism is disputable, undermining a fortiori Briggs and Forbes’s conclusion and supporting the moral that metaphysical theories—or at least Humean Supervenience, the Growing-Block theory, and presentism—are little constrained by truthmaking commitments.

Idioma originalInglés
PublicaciónErkenntnis
DOI
EstadoAceptada/en prensa - 2021
Publicado de forma externa

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